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I.

Introduction and Summary of Conclusions∗
A. Issues
This memorandum addresses evidentiary law surrounding the admissibility of a

consistent pattern of conduct in criminal trials in the Anglo-American, Continental, and
Tribunal legal systems. The first part of this memorandum lays out the basic rules of
evidence for the admission of prior conduct in all three systems. The second part of this
memorandum compares and contrasts the admission of evidence of past conduct in the
Anglo-American and Continental systems. The third part of this memorandum compares
and contrasts the admission of evidence of prior crimes in the Anglo-American and
Continental systems. The fourth part of this memorandum looks at the Tribunal system
and examines where among the evidentiary spectrum the system falls.
B. Summary of Conclusions
i. The American and Continental Legal Systems Differ
Regarding the Admission of Past Misconduct
The American and Continental legal systems differ philosophically regarding the
admission of past misconduct. While the American system forbids the use of past
misconduct to prove character, the Continental system allows the admission of past
misconduct evidence whenever it is relevant. The American system in practice, however,
allows quite a bit of evidence to be admitted that the Continental system will not, such as
evidence of a crime for which the defendant has been acquitted. Overall, the use of past
misconduct evidence in the two systems is more similar than different.
∗

ISSUE: Prepare a comparative legal paper on the procedural rules relating to the
admissibility of evidence of a consistent pattern of conduct in criminal trials with regard
to Anglo-American, Continental, and Tribunal systems of adjudication.

1

ii. The Systems Differ Much More Regarding the Admission of
Prior Convictions
The American and Continental legal systems differ the most in their treatment of
the admission of evidence of prior convictions. In the American system, the evidence
may not be offered to show character, and may be used to impeach the defendant if he
testifies.
In the Continental system, evidence of a prior conviction may be used to show the
inclinations of the defendant and may not be used to impeach the defendant. The main
reason for this disparity is that in the Continental system, while the defendant is usually
heavily questioned in the course of a trial, he is prohibited from testifying under oath and
is under no legal obligation to tell the truth. Since the defendant’s testimony is already
under suspicion, there is no need to impeach with evidence of prior crimes.1
iii. The Tribunal Combines Characteristics of Both Systems
The Tribunal system has characteristics of both the American adversarial system
and the Continental inquisitorial system. In many structural ways, the Tribunals more
closely resemble the adversarial system. The Tribunals’ Rules of Procedure and
Evidence were largely based on a draft submitted by the United States.2 The procedure

1

Mirjan R. Damaska, Propensity Evidence in Continental Legal Systems, 70 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 55, 59-60 (1994). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 32]
2

Michael P. Scharf, Trial and Error: An Assessment of the First Judgment of the
Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal, 30 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 167, 171 (1998).
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 30] (citing the U.S. proposal for the
Tribunal’s rules, reprinted in 2 Virginia Morris & Michael P. Scharf, An Insiders Guide
to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: A Documentary
History and Analysis 509-64 (1995). Following the adoption of the Tribunal’s rules, the
President of the Tribunal stated: “we have adopted a largely adversarial approach to our
procedures, rather than the inquisitorial approach found in continental Europe and
2

followed during trial more closely resemble an adversarial system, including the role of
the lawyers and the placing under oath of all witnesses.3
In its mission of truth finding, however, the Tribunal system more closely
resembles the Continental inquisitorial system. For the most part, this is reflected in the
Tribunals’ liberal policy on the admission of evidence in order to develop a complete
record.4
II.

Factual Background
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”) was created by the

United Nations in 1994.5 Article 14 of the ICTR Charter adopted the Rules of Procedure
and Evidence of the ICTY as its own Rules of Procedure and Evidence, with such
changes as they deemed necessary.6 Originally, Rule 93 under the ICTY Rules of
Procedure and Evidence, which governs the admission into evidence of a consistent
pattern of conduct, read as follows: “Evidence of a consistent pattern of conduct may be
admissible in the interests of justice.”7 The ICTY modified Rule 93 in 1995. As a result,

elsewhere.” Statement by the President Made at a Briefing to Members of Diplomatic
Missions, U.N. Doc. IT/29 (1994), reprinted in 2 Morris & Scharf 650.)
3

Gregory A. McClelland, A Non-Adversary Approach to International Criminal
Tribunals, 26 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV 1, 29 (2002). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 29]
4

Id. at 29.

5

U.N. SCOR Res. 955. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 28]

6

Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda (hereinafter ICTR Statute) art. 14,
reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1598, 1607 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 27]

7

International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia, Rules of Procedure and Evidence,
reproduced in 33 I.L.M. 484, 533 (1994) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
Tab 26]
3

Rule 93 now reads: “(A) Evidence of a consistent pattern of conduct relevant to serious
violations of international humanitarian law under the Statute may be admissible in the
interests of justice. (B) Acts tending to show such a pattern of conduct shall be disclosed
by the Prosecutor to the defense pursuant to Rule 66.”8 This change, adding the
requirement that the Prosecutor disclose evidence of a consistent pattern of conduct to the
defense, was made in the interest of “broaden[ing] the rights of suspects and accused
persons.”9 The ICTR adopted Rule 93 in its amended form. To this point, the Tribunals
have not dealt with the question of admissibility of prior act evidence in their case law.
III.

The Basic Rules Relating to the Admission of Evidence of Prior Conduct
A. The Anglo-American Legal System
i. The United States
1. The Federal Rules of Evidence
a. Rule 403
The basic rule of admissibility in the American system is that all relevant

evidence is admissible.10 However, this basic rule is modified by Federal Rule of
Evidence 403, which states that even relevant evidence can be excluded if “its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the

8

International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, as
amended on 27 May 2003. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 25]

9

Second Annual Report of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, 50th Sess., at paragraph 26 (footnote 9),
U.N. Doc. A/50/365 (1995). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 33]
10

Fed. R. Evid. 402 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 37]
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issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”11 This in effect makes admissibility
questions a balancing act between probative value and prejudicial effect. This rule
affects all of the other American rules of evidence discussed in this memorandum.
There are six basic factors to consider in any Rule 403 balancing consideration.
They are: (1) proximity in time to the charged conduct; (2) similarity to the charged
conduct; (3) frequency of the prior acts; (4) surrounding circumstances; (5) relevant
intervening events; and (6) other relevant similarities or differences.12
b. Rule 404
In the United States, the basic rule of evidence governing the admissibility of
evidence pertaining to prior conduct is Federal Rule of Evidence 404. The first half of
the rule, 404(a), states that character evidence is not admissible to show that an act
conformed with a particular character trait, with certain exceptions.13 The second half of
the rule, 404(b), states generally that evidence of prior acts may not be used to show a
character trait of the accused in order to prove that the defendant’s conduct was
consistent with that character trait.14
In this context, it is important to understand what the Rule means by “character of
the accused.” McCormack, in his treatise on evidence, describes character as “a
generalized description of one’s disposition, or of one’s disposition in respect to a general
11

Fed. R. Evid. 403 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 38]

12

U.S. N.I.T.A. Fed. R. Evid. 413 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 35]

13

Fed. R. Evid. 404 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 34]

14

Id.

5

trait, such as honesty, temperance, or peacefulness….If we speak of character for care,
we think of the person’s tendency to act prudently in all the varying situations of life, in
business, family life, in handling automobiles and in walking across the street.”15 In
addition, courts have generally held that “character traits…need not constitute specific
traits of character but may include general traits such as lawfulness and lawabidingness.”16
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(a)(3) makes exceptions to the general prohibition
on character evidence by allowing admission of character evidence of the defendant
offered by the defendant, admission of character evidence of the defendant offered by the
prosecution to rebut character evidence offered by the defendant, and the impeachment of
a witness by evidence of conviction of a prior crime under Federal Rule of Evidence
609.17 This obviously only applies for the purposes of this memorandum if the defendant
takes the stand. Rule 609 states that evidence that a defendant has been convicted of a
crime punishable by death or more than one year in prison shall be admitted for the
purposes of attacking his credibility if the probative value of the evidence outweighs its
prejudicial effect to the defendant.18 A close reading reveals that this standard differs
somewhat from the general standard of Rule 403 above. Under Rule 403, the prejudicial
effect of a piece of evidence must “substantially outweigh[]” any probative value of that

15

McCormick §162, p. 340. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 43]

16

United States v. Diaz, 961 F.2d 1417, 1419 (9th Cir. 1992). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 13]
17

Fed. R. Evid. 404, supra note 13.

18

Fed. R. Evid. 609 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 42]
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evidence for it to be excluded.19 By the plain language of Rule 609, however, if the
prejudicial effect of the evidence is the same as or outweighs the probative value at all,
the evidence will be excluded.20 Further, evidence that the defendant witness was
convicted of a crime involving dishonesty or false statement is automatically admissible
regardless of punishment.21
Rule 609 does build in some exceptions to the admissibility of prior crimes
evidence. Evidence of a conviction more than ten years old is not admissible unless the
court determines in the interests of justice that the probative value of the conviction
substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect.22 In addition, a conviction subject to a
pardon, annulment, certificate of rehabilitation, or other procedure based on a finding of
rehabilitation is not admissible as long as the defendant has not been convicted of a
subsequent felony, and a conviction subject to a pardon or annulment based on a finding
of innocence is not admissible at all.23 Finally, evidence of juvenile convictions is not
generally admissible under Rule 609.24
FRE 404(b) states that evidence of prior “crimes, wrongs, or acts”25 may not be
used to prove the character of the accused, but rather may only be used to show proof of

19

Fed. R. Evid. 403, supra note 11.

20

Fed. R. Evid. 609, supra note 18.

21

Id.

22

Id.

23

Id.

24

Id.

25

Fed. R. Evid. 404, supra note 13.
7

“motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident.”26 Further, when evidence of prior conduct will be used in a
criminal case, the prosecutor must give notice to the defendant of the nature of the
evidence to be used.27 The evidence of a prior crime will be admitted pursuant to the rule
upon a showing of evidence sufficient to convince a reasonable finder of fact that the
prior act in fact happened.28
c. Rule 406
Evidence of the routine habit of a person may also be used to show that a person’s
conduct on a particular occasion was “in conformity with the habit.”29 Habit, however, is
treated differently than general character evidence. McCormick described character and
habit as “close akin. Character is a generalized description….’Habit,’ in modern usage,
both lay and psychological, is more specific….A habit…is the person’s regular practice
of meeting a particular kind of situation with a specific kind of conduct, such as the habit
of going down a particular stairway two stairs at a time….The doing of the habitual acts
may become semi-automatic.”30 If habit can be proved, it is highly persuasive as proof of
conduct on a particular occasion.31
d. Rule 413
26

Id.

27

Id.

28

U.S. N.I.T.A. Fed. R. Evid. 404 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 34]

29

Fed. R. Evid. 406 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 40]

30

McCormick §162, supra note 15, at 340.

31

Id. at 341.

8

Cases involving sexual assault present a special case with respect to the admission
of prior acts. When a defendant is accused of an offense of sexual assault, evidence of
the commission of any other offense of sexual assault is admissible for any relevant
purpose as long as the Government gives the defendant fifteen days notice of the
evidence it plans to use.32
It is important in this context to define “offense of sexual assault.” According to
Rule 413(d), an “offense of sexual assault” is “(1) any conduct proscribed by chapter
109A of Title 18, United States Code33; (2) contact, without consent, between any part of
the defendant’s body or an object and the genitals or anus of another person; (3) contact,
without consent, between the genitals or anus of the defendant and any part of another
person’s body; (4) deriving sexual pleasure or gratification from the infliction of death,
bodily injury, or physical pain on another person; or (5) an attempt or conspiracy to
engage in conduct described in paragraphs (1)-(4).”34
The Government must meet a ‘sufficient evidence’ standard to admit the evidence
of a prior sexual offense; that is, the court will admit when the Government offers
sufficient evidence to persuade a reasonable fact-finder, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the defendant committed the earlier act of sexual assault or child

32

Fed. R. Evid. 413 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 41]

33

Aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, sexual abuse of a minor or ward, abusive
sexual contact, sexual abuse resulting in death, and any repeat offenses. See 18 U.S.C.
§§2241-2248 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 24]

34

Id.

9

molestation. Unlike Rule 609, Rule 413 does not require that the similar act of sexual
assault be excluded if the defendant was tried and acquitted of the similar act.35
2. Court Interpretations
a. Huddleston v. United States
In 1988, the United States Supreme Court announced a rationale for the admission
of prior (similar) act evidence in their decision in Huddleston v. United States.36 In
Huddleston, a trailer containing 32,000 blank videotapes was stolen. Two days after the
robbery, the defendant contacted another person about selling a large number of
videotapes. The defendant proceeded to reach an agreement to sell 5,000 of the
videotapes. Once the defendant was arrested, the only question for the court was whether
or not the defendant knew that the videotapes were stolen.37 At trial, the government was
allowed over the defendant’s objection to introduce two pieces of prior act evidence.
First, a record store owner was allowed to testify that the defendant told him that he could
procure thousands of black and white televisions to sell. Second, an undercover Federal
Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) agent was allowed to testify that the defendant offered to
sell him twenty-eight refrigerators, two ranges, and forty icemakers for $8,000. It was
later determined that the appliances were worth $20,000 and were part of a shipment that
had been stolen.38

35

U.S. N.I.T.A. Fed. R. Evid. 413, supra note 12.

36

Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681 (1988). [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 3]

37

Id. at 682-83.

38

Id. at 683.
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In deciding that the prior act evidence was properly admitted, the Court both set
the standard for admitting prior act evidence and described the sources of protection from
unfair prejudice for a defendant. First, the Court held that similar act evidence “should
be admitted if there is sufficient evidence to support a finding by the jury that the
defendant committed the similar act.”39 Next, the court went on to outline four sources of
protection from prejudice for defendants:
…first, from the requirement of Rule 404(b) that the evidence be offered
for a proper purpose; second, from the relevancy requirement of rule 402 –
as enforced through rule 104(b); third, from the assessment the trial court
must make under Rule 403 to determine whether the probative value of the
similar acts evidence is substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair
prejudice…; and fourth, from Federal Rule of Evidence 105, which
provides that the trial court shall, upon request, instruct the jury that the
similar acts evidence is to be considered only for the proper purpose for
which it was admitted.40
This decision created the modern test for the admission of prior or similar act evidence.
b. Post Huddleston Case Law
Taking their cue from the Supreme Court, U.S. Circuit Courts have interpreted the
Huddleston decision in three main ways. The Tenth and parts of the Sixth and Seventh
Circuits have developed a four-part test calling for the trial court to (1) determine whether
the evidence is offered for a proper purpose; (2) decide whether it is relevant; (3) decide
whether the probative value of the evidence is outweighed by the risk of unfair

39

Id. at 685.

40

Id. at 691.
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prejudices; and (4) give a limiting instruction to the jury upon request of one of the
parties.41
A second four-part test was developed in the Third, Eighth, Ninth and part of the
Seventh Circuits. This test directs the trial courts to decide whether other crimes
evidence (1) relates to a matter in issue other than general propensity; (2) proves an act
that is similar enough and close enough in time to be relevant; (3) suffices to support a
jury finding that the act happened and that defendant committed it; and (4) possesses
probative value that is not outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice.42
The First, Fifth, and part of the Sixth Circuits have enunciated a third test. This
test, a two-part test, calls for trial courts to determine whether (1) the other act evidence is
relevant for some purpose other than general propensity; and (2) prejudicial impact of the
evidence substantially outweighs its probative value.43
Courts in the United States have admitted a wide variety of activity into evidence
under Rule 404(b)’s “other purposes” language. Testimony that a defendant had
41

See, e.g., United States v. Bakke, 942 F.2d 977 (6th Cir. 1991) [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 9]; United States v. Murphy, 935 F.2d 899 (7th Cir. 1991)
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 19]; United States v. Morgan, 936
F.2d 1561 (10th Cir. 1991). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 18]
42

See, e.g., Government of Virgin Islands v. Edwards, 903 F.2d 267 (3rd Cir. 1990)
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2] ; United States v. Wright, 943 F.2d
748 (7th Cir. 1991) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 23]; United States
v. Brown, 948 F.2d 1076 (8th Cir. 1991) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
Tab 10]; United States v. Rubio-Villareal, 927 F.2d 1495 (9th Cir. 1991). [Reproduced in
the accompanying notebook at Tab 22]
43

See, e.g., United States v. DesMarais, 938 F.2d 347 (1st Cir. 1991) [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 12]; United States v. Gonzalez-Lira, 936 F.2d 281 (5th
Cir. 1991) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 15]; United States v.
Feinman, 930 F.2d 495 (6th Cir. 1991). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
Tab 14]
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threatened and plotted to harm witnesses against him, evidence depicting the defendant’s
car thefts, the defendant’s plans for robbery, the defendant’s plans to escape from prison,
and the defendant’s drug activity have all been admitted as prior act evidence as
probative of the defendant’s criminal plan and motive and intent to kill a witness against
him at his trial.44 Evidence of participation in similar drug transactions, evidence of a
prior conviction for nearly identical counterfeiting activity, and evidence of a previous
attempt to import large quantities of narcotics were all admissible to show knowledge.45
Six robberies for which the defendant was not indicted were admitted into
evidence to show the identity of the defendant in the robbery for which he was indicted.46
In a trial for sexual abuse, the testimony of six women who were employees of the
defendant and who alleged that the defendant sexually abused them during their
employment was admissible and relevant to show a common scheme of sexually abusive
behavior.47 Finally, the death by gunshot wound of the defendant’s previous wife was
admitted into evidence to show lack of accident and intent in the defendant’s trial for the
murder of his current wife.48

44

United States v. Clark, 988 F. 2d 1459, 1465 (6th Cir. 1993). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 11]
45

United States v. Gordon, 987 F. 2d 902, 908-9 (2nd Cir. 1993). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 16]
46

United States v. Mack, 258 F. 3d 548, 554 (6th Cir. 2001). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 17]
47

United States v. Roberts, 185 F. 3d 1125, 1142 (10th Cir. 1999). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 20]

48

State v. Murillo, 509 S.E. 2d 752, 764 (N.C. 1998). [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 8]
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ii. Canada
1. R. v. Handy
The Canadian Supreme Court laid out the rationale and the test for the admission
of similar act evidence in R. v. Handy.49 In Handy, the defendant stood accused of sexual
assault causing bodily harm. The Crown attempted to enter into evidence seven similar
incidents that had previously occurred between the defendant and the victim where the
defendant had the propensity to inflict painful sex when aroused and would not take no
for an answer.50 The trial judge in the case admitted the evidence,51 but the Court of
Appeal overruled, holding that the evidence should have been excluded.52 The Supreme
Court of Canada took up the case and examined the rationale behind the inclusion of
similar act evidence.
First, the Court explained the historical rationale behind the general exclusion of
disposition evidence. The court held that “it is undoubtedly not competent for the
prosecution to adduce evidence tending to [show] that the accused has been guilty of
criminal acts other than those covered by the indictment, for the purpose of leading to the
conclusion that the accused is a person likely from his criminal conduct or character to
have committed the [offense] for which he is being tried.”53

49

R. v. Handy, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 908 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab

6]
50

Id. at para. 2.

51

Id. at para. 17.

52

Id. at para. 19.
Id. at para. 33 (quoting Makin v. Attorney General for New South Wales [1894] A.C.
57).

53
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Next, the Court explained the reasons for making an exception to a general
exclusionary rule. The Court “recognized that an issue may arise…to which evidence of
previous misconduct may be so highly relevant and cogent that its probative value in the
search for truth outweighs any potential for misuse… [if] the similarities were such that
absent collaboration, it would be an affront to common sense to suggest that the
similarities were due to coincidence.”54
Finally, the Court determined the basic test for the admissibility of similar act
evidence and established the burden of proof. The Court found that “in considering the
admissibility of similar fact evidence, the basic rule is that the trial judge must first
determine whether the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect.”55
Lastly, the “onus is on the prosecution to satisfy the trial judge on a balance of
probabilities that in the contest of the particular case the probative value of the evidence
in relation to a particular issue outweighs its potential prejudice and thereby justifies its
reception.”56
2. R. v. Shearing
After Handy, the issue in Canadian law becomes the procedure used to balance
prejudicial effect against probative value. In R. v. Shearing,57 the Canadian Supreme
Court applied the principles of Handy to another sexual assault case.

54

Id. at para. 41. (quoting R. v. B. (C.R.) [1990] 1 S.C.R. 717) [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 5]

55
56

57

Id. at para. 54.
Id. at para. 55.
R. v. Shearing [2002] 3 S.C.R. 33. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab

7]
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The Court first examined the probative value of the similar act evidence. The first
issue of probative value the Court discusses is the strength of the evidence including the
potential for collusion. This issue “turns largely on the improbability of coincidence.”58
Further, if the court decides that “the evidence is not a product of concoction,”59 the jury
must then “determine for itself what weight, if any, to assign to the similar fact
evidence.”60 The second issue of probative value discussed by the Court is the
identification of the issues in question. Examples given by the court include whether the
act in question actually occurred61 and whether spiritual authority can prevent the
formation of consent for sex.62 Finally with respect to the probative value of similar act
evidence, the Court considered similarities and dissimilarities between the facts charged
and the similar fact evidence. The court considered six factors when discussing
similarities and dissimilarities. They were: (1) the proximity in time of the similar acts
to the charged conduct63; (2) the extent to which the other acts are similar in detail to the
charged conduct64; (3) the number of occurrences of the similar acts65; (4) the

58

Id. at para. 40.

59

Id. at para. 41.

60

Id. at para. 42.

61

Id. at para. 46.

62

Id. at para. 47.

63

Id. at para. 51. (Conduct spread over 25 years demonstrated a degree of extended
consistency in behavior.)

64

Id. at para. 52. (Similarity can lie in the physical act of sex itself or in the modus
operandi used to create sexual opportunities.)
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circumstances surrounding or relating to the similar acts66; (5) any distinctive features
unifying the incidents of the similar acts67; and (6) any intervening events.68
The Court then examined the issue of potential prejudice to the defendant. The
Court considered two kinds of prejudice: moral prejudice and reasoning prejudice. The
moral prejudice is “the risk of an [unfocused] trial and a wrongful conviction.”69 The
factors the Court felt would contribute to the moral prejudice included the inflammatory
nature of the combination of sex and religion and the “sheer cumulative number of
alleged incidents.” 70 The Court described the reasoning prejudice as the “danger…that
the jury may become confused by the multiplicity of incidents.”71 The Court worried that
the jury “might mix up matters of consideration (the similar acts) with matters of decision
(the charge).”72 The Court concluded that when the probative value of the similar act
evidence outweighs the prejudicial effect, the similar act evidence should be admitted.73

65

Id. at para. 53. (Hundreds of instances were clearly enough to establish situation
specific behavior.)

66

Id. at paras. 54-58. (The more similar the circumstances surrounding the behaviors, the
more probative value the similar act evidence is likely to have.)

67

Id. at paras. 59-61. (Distinctive similarities and differences should be considered by the
trial judge.)

68

Id. at para. 62. (No analysis of intervening events given.)

69

Id. at para. 65.
Id. at para. 65.

70

71

Id. at para. 68.

72

Id. at para. 69.

73

Id. at para. 74.
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B. The Continental Legal System
“Anyone expecting to find elaborate doctrines in continental European evidence
law regarding information about a person’s character, predilections, or incidents from
past life, is bound to be disappointed.”74 According to Mirjan R. Damaska, there seem to
be two reasons for this phenomenon: (1) distaste for rules that “call for an advance
assessment of the probative effect of evidence,”75 and (2) the fact that professional and
lay finders of fact work together intimately to decide all issues.76
The Continental system is mostly concerned with whether or not a particular piece
of evidence has any probative value. This, combined with two other factors, makes it
particularly difficult to discard evidence of a defendant’s past conduct. First, Continental
trials are not divided into separate ‘guilt-determining’ and sentencing phases. As a result,
before a court retires to deliberate on the issue of guilt, it has heard evidence relevant to
sentencing, including information on the accused character, propensities, and prior
conduct.77 Second, the court conducts witness interrogation in a narrative fashion. This
style allows witnesses “considerable freedom” in their testimony as compared to the
questioning style in American courts. 78
C. The Tribunal System

74

Damaska, supra note 1, at 55. This applies to statutory provisions as well as rules of
evidence. Id.

75

Id.

76

Id. at 56.

77

Id. at 56.

78

Id. at 57.
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i. Rule 89(C) and (D)
The basic rule governing the admissibility of evidence in the ICTY and the ICTR
is Rule 89. Rule 89(C) states that any relevant evidence deemed to have probative value
may be admitted.79 Rule 89(D) states that relevant evidence may be excluded if “its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the need to ensure a fair trial.”80
ii. Rule 93
Rule 93 takes the general admissibility of relevant evidence espoused by Rule 89
and applies it specifically to evidence of a specific pattern of conduct. The Rule states:
“A) Evidence of a consistent pattern of conduct relevant to serious violations of
international humanitarian law under the Statute may be admissible in the interests of
justice. (B) Acts tending to show such a pattern of conduct shall be disclosed by the
Prosecutor to the defense pursuant to Rule 66.”81
IV.

Admission of Past Misconduct
A. The Anglo-American Legal System
i. Uncharged Past Misconduct
Past misconduct is not always admissible when offered to show “proof of motive,

opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident.”82 The Supreme Court has stated that the decision to admit evidence under
Rule 404(b) also depends on “whether the danger of unfair prejudice [substantially]
79

International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, as
amended on 27 May 2003, supra note 8.

80

Id.

81

Id. at 535.

82

Fed. R. Evid. 404(b), supra note 12.
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outweighs the probative value of the evidence in view of the availability of other means
of proof and other factors appropriate for making decisions of this kind under Rule
403.”83 As such, the basic rule of admitting past misconduct is that if the probative value
of the prior misconduct is not substantially outweighed by any prejudice to the defendant,
the evidence may be admitted if not offered to show character.
ii. Prior Acquittals
In Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342 (1990), the Supreme Court made an
end run around rule 404(b) to assert that prior bad acts are not necessarily excluded
merely because the defendant has been acquitted. While the Rule 404(b) question was
never raised in court, the Court theorized that since Huddleston the prosecution only
needed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant had committed the
prior act. Using this theory, an acquittal is not necessarily a bar to admission because the
standard of proof is much lower under Huddleston than in a criminal proceeding.84
iii. Prior Arrests
Since a prior act can be admitted even if the defendant had been acquitted, it
stands to reason that a prior arrest would also be admissible. This is the case, but only
under certain circumstances. Evidence of an arrest alone is not enough for admission, but

83

Huddleston, supra note 36, at 688. (Holding that if similar act evidence is submitted for
a proper purpose it is subject only to general strictures on admissibility such as relevance
and probative value / prejudicial effect balancing.)[Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 3]

84

Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342 (1990). [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 1]
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if evidence of the specific activities of the defendant and the circumstances leading to his
arrest were provided, that would be enough for admission.85
B. The Continental Legal System
“Observed from the common law’s vantage point, continental law is strangely
silent on evidence of collateral misconduct that does not contravene the criminal law and
on evidence of collateral crime that has not resulted in a conviction.”86 As stated above,
Continental courts seem to be interested exclusively in the probative value of prior
misconduct. For this reason, instances of conduct such as prior sexual misconduct,
training in pick pocketing, and mere fraternization with known criminals can be used as
evidence of guilt.87 Evidence of prior misconduct alone, however is not enough to
convict. This evidence can only be used to corroborate other evidence.88
There are, however, some instances in which a Continental court will not allow
the admission of evidence of prior misconduct. Prior criminal proceedings that did not
result in a conviction provide one example. In a German case, the defendant was tried for
the arson of his mill, the site of two previous suspicious fires that resulted in criminal
proceedings against the defendant. These proceedings, however, never reached the trial
stage. The trial court used the two previous prosecutions to support conviction for the
third. On appeal, the appellate court reversed, finding that the two prior prosecutions
85

U.S.C.S. Fed. R. Evid. 404 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 36]
(citing United States v. Robinson, 978 F.2d 1554 (10th Cir. 1992).) [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 21]
86

Damaska, supra note 1, at 60.

87

Id. at 61.

88

Id. at 62.
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were based on unsubstantiated rumor. The appellate court suggested that had the sources
of the rumors been available and had the rumors been of probative value in the arson
case, they would have been admitted.89
In addition, some Continental courts will refuse to hear evidence of prior
misconduct for which the defendant could have been prosecuted but was not. This
reluctance is partly explained by the Continental practice of mandatory prosecution. In
many Continental jurisdictions, the practice of prosecutorial discretion does not exist;
when evidence of a crime exists, the prosecutor must prosecute.90 Finally, some
Continental jurisdictions refuse to admit evidence of a crime that the defendant was
found not guilty of, although there is no consensus on this position.91
V.

Admission of Prior Convictions
A. The Anglo-American Legal System
The American legal system’s treatment of prior convictions evidence is simple

compared with its treatment of prior misconduct. As stated Rule 404(b), evidence of a
prior conviction may be used only to show proof of “motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.”92 In addition,
if the defendant is a witness, evidence of a prior conviction may be used to impeach his
testimony subject to Rule 609, described above.93

89

Id. at 62-63.

90

Id. at 63.

91

Id. at 63-64.

92

Fed. R. Evid. 404, supra note 13.

93

Fed. R. Evid. 609, supra note 18.
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B. The Continental Legal System
The Continental legal system provides a stark contrast to the American legal
system in its treatment of the admission of evidence of prior convictions. While it is
generally said that it is improper to assume that a person who has committed a crime is
more likely to commit that crime again, the treatment of prior crimes in Continental
courts belies that notion.94
The Continental system does have some similarities with the American system.
Evidence of prior crimes may be used to establish elements of a crime or a particular
modus operandi and evidence of prior crimes that have been expunged may not be used
against a defendant.95 The similarities end here, however.
Unlike in the American system, a criminal record can be used to establish a
“particular inclination” of the defendant as long as the inclination can be inferred from
the conduct that led to the prior conviction. In fact, the more unusual the inclination, the
more likely it is that the evidence will be used.96 For example, while homosexuality was
a criminal offense in Germany, prior convictions for homosexual behavior were used as
circumstantial evidence of guilt in subsequent proceedings.97
While the Continental system seems more likely overall to admit evidence of
prior crimes than the American system, the real difference between the two arises over
impeachment of witnesses. In the Continental legal system, the use of prior crimes

94

Damaska, supra note 1, at 58.

95

Id. at 59-60.

96

Id. at 58-59.

97

Id.
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evidence to impeach the defendant’s testimony is prohibited.98 This contrasting result
can be explained by how the defendant is treated in the Continental legal system. First of
all, while the defendant is usually heavily questioned in the course of a trial, he is
prohibited from testifying under oath and is under no legal obligation to tell the truth.
Since the defendant’s testimony is already under suspicion, there is no need to impeach
with evidence of prior crimes.99 In addition, the above-mentioned lack of prosecutorial
discretion results in a trial for all charged offenses, eliminating the problem of a
defendant who has a criminal record merely as a result of plea-bargaining.100
VI.

The Tribunal System
To this point, none of the tribunals has dealt with the question of prior act

admissibility in their case law. To help answer the question of whether the tribunals
should follow the American adversarial model or the Continental non-adversarial model,
it would be helpful to analyze the similarities the tribunal has with each system.
As noted above, the ICTR adopted the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the
ICTY as its Rules of Procedure and Evidence in Article 14 of the Statute.101 The ICTY’s
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, by turn, were “largely modeled upon a draft submitted
by the United States, reflecting the American adversarial system rather than the
inquisitorial system prevalent in civil law countries.”102 The Tribunals follow an

98

Id. at 59.

99

Id. at 59-60.

100

Id. at 60.

101

ICTR Statute, supra note 6, art. 14.

102

Scharf, supra note 2, at 171.
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essentially adversarial approach to the presentation of evidence at trial, with each side
presenting its case, and witnesses for each side subject to cross examination by the other.
Other factors also point to the adversarial model. Each side is responsible for its own
expert witnesses.103 ‘Guilt-finding’ proceedings and sentencing proceedings are held
separately where the defendant pleads guilty. All witnesses are placed under oath. There
is no provision for a de novo review of trial proceedings on appeal.104 Further, the
current form of Rule 93, with its insistence on notice to the defendant, now more closely
mirrors the wording of FRE 404(b).105
The Tribunals do share some characteristics with the Continental model. During
the ICTY’s first case, the Tadic trial, the defense counsel urged the Trial Chamber to
follow American evidentiary rules and exclude hearsay statements in situations where
there were no circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness. The Trial Chamber refused,
instead holding that Rule 89(C) allows in any evidence deemed to have probative
value.106 Gregory A. McClelland posits that the rationales for this decision are that it
enhances the search for truth and that the ICTY’s triers of fact are professional jurists,
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McClelland, supra note 3, at 29.

104

Id., at 30-31.
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Rule 93(B) of the Tribunal now reads “[a]cts tending to show such a pattern of
conduct shall be disclosed by the Prosecutor to the defense pursuant to Rule 66.” Rule
404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence reads, in part, “the prosecution in a criminal case
shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial…of the general nature of any such
evidence it intends to introduce at trial.”
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Prosecutor v. Tadic, No. IT-94-1-T, paras. 555-56. [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 4]
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both factors which point to the Continental legal model.107 Another factor which points
to the Continental model is that findings of guilt do not need to be unanimous, rather only
two of the three judges on an ICTY panel must find the defendant guilty.108
The majority of factors point to the Tribunal system following the adversarial
model. As an extension of this model, the Tribunal could follow the adversarial model for
admitting evidence of prior conduct. There are several arguments, however, that the
Tribunal system would be better served following more of a Continental model.
The Tribunal system has four basic justifications: creating an accurate historical
record; advancing international jurisprudence and the international rule of law;
individualizing guilt; and doing justice.109 Possibly the most important and fundamental
function of the international criminal tribunals is creating an accurate historical record.110
Continental legal systems have an ability to create a full record lying partly in the
judicially controlled fact collection and partly in the absence of rules prohibiting the use
of prior act evidence. In fact, Continental law does not “contain rules excluding relevant
evidence on the ground that factfinders might erroneously assess its credibility and thus
endanger factfinding precision.”111 Continental lawyers are much more pragmatic,
believing that relying on a case-by-case approach is better than framing general rules.112

107

McClelland, supra note 3, at 30.
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Id.
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Id. at 2-5.
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Id. at 37.
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Mirjan Damaska, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal
Procedure: A Comparative Study, 121 U. Pa. L. Rev. 506, 514 (1973). [Reproduced in
the accompanying notebook at Tab 31]
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One possible way to improve the Tribunal system’s search for truth may be to
entrust the evidence gathering process to neutral agencies, make the results of
investigations available to both parties, give the Presiding Judge control over the witness
list and maintain the Presiding Judge’s primary responsibility for presenting evidence and
questioning witnesses, subject the defendant to questioning at any time, and subject the
Tribunal’s decisions to de novo review on appeal.113 These suggestions would obviously
shift the balance of the Tribunal’s nature to the Continental system, which may better suit
the four major justifications of the Tribunal system. This may be a better fit for the
Tribunal, for while the language of Rule 93 may look like the language of Rule 404(b),
the Tadic decision shows an interpretation of the rule more appropriate to the Continental
system.
VII.

Conclusion

The American and Continental legal systems differ philosophically regarding the
admission of past misconduct. While the American system forbids the use of past
misconduct to prove character, the Continental system allows the admission of past
misconduct evidence whenever it is relevant. The American system in practice, however,
allows quite a bit of evidence to be admitted that the Continental system will not, such as
evidence of a crime for which the defendant has been acquitted. Overall, the use of past
misconduct evidence in the two systems is more similar than different.
The American and Continental legal systems differ the most in their treatment of
the admission of evidence of prior convictions. In the American system, the evidence
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McClelland, supra note 3, at 37-38.
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may not be offered to show character, and may be used to impeach the defendant if he
testifies.
In the Continental system, evidence of a prior conviction may be used to show the
inclinations of the defendant and may not be used to impeach the defendant. The main
reason for this disparity is that in the Continental system, while the defendant is usually
heavily questioned in the course of a trial, he is prohibited from testifying under oath and
is under no legal obligation to tell the truth. Since the defendant’s testimony is already
under suspicion, there is no need to impeach with evidence of prior crimes.114
The Tribunal system has characteristics of both the American adversarial system
and the Continental inquisitorial system. In body, the Tribunals more closely resemble
the adversarial system. The Tribunals’ Rules of Procedure and Evidence were largely
based on a draft submitted by the United States.115 The procedure followed during trial
more closely resemble an adversarial system, including the role of the lawyers and the
placing under oath of all witnesses.116
In spirit, however, the Tribunal system more closely resembles the Continental
inquisitorial system due to it’s primary mission of truth finding. For the most part, this is
reflected in the Tribunals’ liberal policy on the admission of evidence in order to develop
a complete record.117 For this reason, it may be advantageous to argue for a continuing
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interpretation of the Tribunal’s Rules of Evidence that is more consistent with the
Continental model of evidence.
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